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“There can be no doubt that despite their titles, ‘United States’ Attorneys undoubtedly make 
charging and other decisions based on what they see as the needs and values of the communities in 
which they work.  It is therefore not surprising that state-by-state disparities in the administration 
of federal death sentences correlate with the frequency with which U.S. Attorneys request Main 
Justice’s approval to seek death sentences.  And, arguably, this is not just acceptable, but rather is 
fundamental if we are to survive as a united federalism in a nation whose values differ 
profoundly from one part to another.”     
 —Judge Guido Calabresi
1
 
“Implicit in the dissent’s discussion of this point is an unwarranted factual assumption:  that a 
local United States Attorney’s view regarding the appropriate sentence for a crime mirrors the 
values of the community in which he serves.  This is hardly obvious given that United States 
Attorneys are not elected to their positions but are appointed by the President of the United States, 
who himself may or may not have received a majority of the votes cast in the district at issue.”
 —Judge Reena Raggi2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In September 2000, the Department of Justice released a compre-
hensive statistical survey that examined the Department’s process for 
seeking the federal death penalty.3  Troubled by allegations of racial 
and regional disparity in the application of the federal death penalty, 
President Bill Clinton commissioned the study a few months before 
Juan Raul Garza was scheduled to be the first prisoner executed by 
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 1 United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 287–88 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc) (citation omitted). 
 2 Id. at 279 (Raggi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM:  A STATISTICAL SURVEY 
(1988–2000) (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc /dpsurvey.html. 
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the federal government in more than thirty-seven years.4  Analyzing 
the period from November 1988 through July 2000, the survey 
tracked the number of recommendations and authorizations to seek 
the death penalty by judicial district, race of the victim, and race of 
the defendant.5  Though some who read the report differed in their 
interpretations of the data regarding race,6 no one could dispute that 
the study indicated the existence of clear geographic disparities, 
demonstrated most notably by the fact that only five of all ninety-four 
federal districts were responsible for submitting more than 42% of all 
the cases reviewed by the Department of Justice for capital prosecu-
tion.7 
The Justice Department’s study weighed in at 422 pages, analyzing 
decisions made with regard to 682 defendants and parsing the data 
into eighty-six different tables.8  In June 2001, a supplementary report 
was released that examined a larger pool of 973 defendants.9  The re-
 
 4 See President Bill Clinton, Press Conference (June 28, 2000), available at 
http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/New/html/conference2000-06-28.html (“The issues at the 
federal level relate more to the disturbing racial composition of those who have been 
convicted and the apparent fact that almost all the convictions are coming out of just a 
handful of states, which raises the question of whether, even though there is a uniform 
law across the country, what your prosecution is may turn solely on where you committed 
the crime.  I’ve got a review underway of both those issues at this time.”); Press Release, 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Date Set for First Federal Execution Since 1963 (May 26, 2000), 
available at http://www.bop.gov/news/press/press_releases/ipapr003.jsp.  As the result 
of a short-lived stay of execution, Garza was not the first federal prisoner to be executed; 
Timothy McVeigh, the Gulf War veteran responsible for the 1995 bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City that claimed the lives of 168 people, was executed 
first.  See Alex Rodriguez, U.S. Executes McVeigh:  Oklahoma City Bomber is 1st Federal Inmate 
Put to Death Since ’63, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2001, at 1. 
 5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-14–T-17. 
 6 Compare Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Const., Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold) (“[T]here are now 19 individuals 
on Federal death row; 17 of them are racial or ethnic minorities.  That is an extraordinary 
number.”) [hereinafter Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System] 
with id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (“[T]he studies . . . show that there is no 
invidious racial discrimination in the application of the Federal death penalty.  Indeed, if 
anything, these studies show that the Federal Government has sought the death penalty 
for proportionately fewer minorities than whites.”). 
 7 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-15–T-17; see also Racial and Geographic Dispari-
ties in the Federal Death Penalty System, supra note 6, at 15 (statement of Larry Thompson, 
Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States) (noting that the Eastern District of Virginia, the 
District of Puerto Rico, the District of Maryland, the Eastern District of New York, and the 
Southern District of New York were “the districts which generated the largest numbers of 
capital offense charges, accounting collectively for about half of the cases submitted to 
the Department’s review procedure”). 
 8 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3. 
 9 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM:  SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, 
ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (2001), available at 
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lease of those two reports generated a flurry of attention both in aca-
demic circles and among the news reports of the mainstream media.10  
Since then, much ink has been devoted to scrutinizing the federal 
death penalty. 
Prison population figures recently published by the Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics suggest that out of the more than 2.3 million people in-
carcerated in the United States,11 about 3,297 of them (0.1%) are 
awaiting execution.12  Of those 3,297, only fifty-five (1.7%) are on 
federal death row.13  Equally remarkable is the tiny number of federal 
executions compared to “stateside” executions.  Since 1977, 1,173 
people have been executed in the United States.14  Of those individu-
als, only three (0.3%) were federal convicts.15  Since the creation of 
the American republic more than two centuries ago, the federal gov-
ernment has executed 340 people,16 whereas the State of Texas has 
executed more than that many in the past fifteen years.17  As one 
commentator has noted, “the score of prisoners on federal death row 
are in some respects little more than a footnote.”18 
 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm.  In addition to the 682 cases 
in the 2000 report, the Supplemental Report examined 60 cases that had gone or were 
going through the review process or involved fugitives, and 231 cases that (1) should have 
been, but were not, submitted to the capital case review procedure; (2) were exempted 
from submission because the defendant pled to a noncapital offense; or (3) could have 
been brought as death-eligible cases but were not. 
 10 It is not coincidental that these reports were published and so much attention directed to 
the federal death penalty around the same time that the United States was preparing for 
the first federal execution in nearly four decades.  See supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
 11 HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT 
MIDYEAR 2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 16 (2009), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pim08st.pdf (stating that custody count excludes inmates held in U.S. Territories, 
military facilities, immigration facilities, jails in Indian country, and juvenile facilities). 
 12 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2009), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf. 
 13 Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Death Row Prisoners, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) 
(listing fifty-eight federal death row inmates including John Wayne Johnson, a convicted 
murderer who will be sentenced in February 2010, David Runyon, a convicted murderer 
who will be sentenced in December 2009, and David Paul Hammer, a long-time death 
row inmate whose death sentence was vacated in United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 
676 (M.D. Pa. 2005), appeal dismissed 564 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 14 Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).  
 15 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FEDERAL EXECUTIONS 1927–2003,  http://www. deathpenalty-
info.org/article.php? scid=29&did=149. 
 16 John Brigham, Unusual Punishment:  The Federal Death Penalty in the United States, 16 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 195, 209 (2004). 
 17 Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 14. 
 18 Brigham, supra note 16, at 212. 
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Given the comparatively small number of individuals subject to 
the federal death penalty, some scholars have thought it necessary to 
defend the institution as a worthy candidate for study.  We share the 
opinion of Rory K. Little, a law professor who served as Associate 
Deputy Attorney General and a member of the Justice Department’s 
Capital Case Review Committee, that the “unique federalist nature of 
the American system” arouses particular intrigue in the context of 
application of the death penalty.19  Professor Little predicted that the 
Federal Government’s shift in 2000 from “merely not preventing 
some of the subsidiary states from [executing offenders]” toward self-
implemented executions at the national level would have symbolic 
significance for the United States at home and abroad.20  It is not 
clear that international critics of capital punishment have noticed the 
change.21  However, American observers have noted that the recent 
rise in federal death penalty prosecutions, federal death sentences, 
and federal executions evokes serious and interesting questions of 
federalism, uniformity, states’ rights, and community values.22 
Understanding American federalism at its most basic level re-
quires familiarity with the hierarchy of national and local power es-
tablished by the Framers.  Article VI of the United States Constitution 
declares that federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land” and super-
sedes conflicting state and local laws.23  Accordingly, Congress may 
“authorize its own lawful punishments for criminal conduct within its 
jurisdictional reach, regardless of state or local objections.”24  As the 
Supreme Court has held, “[i]f [a] statute be a valid exercise of [fed-
 
 19 Rory K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 537 (2000). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See, e.g., Roger Hood, Capital Punishment:  A Global Perspective, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 331 
(2001). 
 22 See, e.g., United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“For a federalism like ours—made up as it is of 
states whose populations hold widely different moral viewpoints—to work, perhaps even 
to survive, it is at least arguable that the values of the citizens of the state in question—not 
just a minority of them—be reflected in trial juries, even in federal cases.”); Rory K. Little, 
The Federal Death Penalty:  History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 357 (1999) (“Significant federalism and state sovereignty issues 
lurk beneath the surface of a nationally uniform federal death penalty.”). 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
der the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 24 Rory K. Little, Good Enough for Government Work?:  The Tension Between Uniformity and Differ-
ing Regional Values in Administering the Federal Death Penalty, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 8 
(2001). 
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eral] power, how it may affect persons or states is not material to be 
considered.  It is the supreme law of the land and persons and states 
are subject to it.”25  However, two of the most acclaimed values of fed-
eralism are that it enhances democratic rule by providing govern-
ment that is closer to the people and that it protects the autonomy of 
one State to chart for itself a different course than that chosen by its 
sister States.26  Those two values are inherently entwined, and both 
suggest that uniformity may not be a desired consequence of federal-
ism.  As Justice Brandeis wrote, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic ex-
periments without risk to the rest of the country.”27 
With regard to capital punishment, Michigan was that “single cou-
rageous State” when, in 1846, it became the first English-speaking ju-
risdiction in the world to abolish the death penalty.28  Michigan was 
followed by Rhode Island in 1852 and then by Wisconsin in 1853.29  
The trend towards abolition continued slowly and was most recently 
manifested in New Mexico’s decision to repeal its death penalty stat-
ute earlier this year.30  In the United States today, fifteen states and 
the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty, whereas 
the remaining thirty-five States, the federal government, and the mili-
tary have retained it.31 
Criticizing the traditional understanding of federalism’s benefits, 
one scholar has suggested that “the greatest beauty of federalism is its 
redundancy:  multiple levels of government over the same territory 
and population, each with the ability to act.”32  This argument finds 
relief in that, if the federal government fails to act, appropriate action 
by the state and local governments remains possible (and vice versa).  
 
 25 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913). 
 26 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525 (1995); see also 
United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (“One of the by-products of our 
nation’s federal system is the doctrine of ‘dual sovereignty’ . . . . This doctrine rests upon 
the basic structure of our polity.  The states and the national government are distinct po-
litical communities, drawing their separate sovereign power from different sources, each 
from the organic law that established it.  Each has the power, inherent in any sovereign, 
independently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority and to punish 
such offenses.”). 
 27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 28 Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 76 (1987). 
 29 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY:  AN AMERICAN HISTORY 134 (2002). 
 30 Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A16. 
 31 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 12, at 1. 
 32 Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 538. 
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In that vein, proponents of capital punishment contend that it is not 
merely acceptable, but desirable, for the federal government to seek 
the death penalty in States that do not have it.33  Others, however, in-
cluding some death penalty opponents, contend that the federal gov-
ernment should not be able to perform “an end-run” around state 
laws prohibiting capital punishment.34 
The federal government’s pursuit of the death penalty in non-
death penalty states is a very recent phenomenon.  Nine years ago, 
each of the twenty-one defendants then on federal death row had 
been convicted in states where the death penalty was available.35  Each 
defendant had been convicted of an offense prohibited by both state 
law and federal law and punishable by death in either jurisdiction.36  
Indeed, “not only could the conduct at issue in each case have been 
prosecuted under existing state statutes, but the same penalty could 
have been obtained.”37  However, given the Department of Justice’s 
expansion of the death penalty into non-death penalty states, that is 
no longer true.  On March 16, 2002, Marvin Gabrion became the first 
person sentenced to death in a non-death penalty state under the 
federal system since the federal death penalty was reintroduced twen-
ty-one years ago.38  Since then, eight other defendants from six other 
non-death penalty states have been condemned to death.39 
It should be noted that the federal government’s incursion into 
the arena of criminal law raises serious states’ rights questions regard-
less of whether the death penalty is at issue.  The enforcement of 
 
 33 See Anthony M. DeStefano, 2003 Slaying of Undercover Cops; Charges Keep Death Penalty in 
Play, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 23, 2004, at A17 (describing how the district attorney trans-
ferred prosecution to federal government so that federal death penalty could be sought 
after state courts ruled that New York’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional); Ed 
White, Death Penalty Case Is a First;  The Father of a Woman Whose Body Was Found in a Na-
tional Forest Lake Praises the Federal Government’s Pursuit of Capital Punishment, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, Feb. 27, 2001, at A1 (giving an example of the death penalty sought in federal 
court in Michigan). 
 34 Corey Dade, Execution Foes Spin Sampson Verdict; Critics Say Case Doesn’t Reflect State Opinion, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 2003, at B1. 
 35 Little, supra note 19, at 542–44. 
 36 Id.; see also id. at 541–42 (“Virtually every federal offense for which death is an available 
penalty is duplicative of some common state criminal offense.  Murder is, of course, a 
crime in every American jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 37 Id. at 542. 
 38 Ed White, Gabrion’s Lawyer:  Sentence Not Justifiable; Rachel Timmerman’s Family, However, Is 
Relieved After the Jury Decides Her Killer Should Die, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 17, 2002, at 
A1. 
 39 FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES RESULTING IN A SENTENCE OF 
DEATH 6–14, http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Death%20Row.pdf. 
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criminal law has traditionally been an area of state concern.40  As the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged, the “States possess primary au-
thority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.”41  The creation 
of federal crimes and federal penalties has been “opposed and la-
mented as unwarranted intrusions into the states’ domain.”42  How-
ever, the federal government has become increasingly involved in 
criminal justice; federal criminal law now reaches 
virtually all robberies, most schemes to defraud, many firearms offenses, 
all loan sharking, most illegal gambling operations, most briber-
ies, . . . every drug deal, no matter how small . . . . anti-abortion violence, 
carjacking, failure to pay child support, . . . ‘animal rights terror-
ism.’ . . . domestic violence, providing material support to terrorists, te-
lemarketing fraud, interstate computer hacking, misuse of credit cards 
and ATM cards, possession of handguns by juveniles, art theft, and ob-
structing a lawful hunt.43 
Though the federalization of crime implicates a myriad of issues that 
deserve thoughtful examination quite apart from how it relates to 
capital punishment, the aim of this Article is decidedly narrower.44 
Our main focus here is to explore how, under the direction of 
former Attorneys General John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and Mi-
chael Mukasey, the Department of Justice pursued capital prosecu-
tions in jurisdictions that had abolished or not provided for the death 
penalty.45  The Department’s position was that it pursued such cases 
 
 40 See Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn’t Welcome Here:  Evaluating the Federal Death Pen-
alty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objection to Capital Punishment, 64 ALB. L. REV. 
1435, 1445 (2001). 
 41 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). 
 42 John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:  Advantages of 
Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1095 (1995). 
 43 Id. at 1095–97 (footnotes omitted). 
 44 Other commentators have addressed some of these matters.  See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Criminal Mischief:  The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 
(1995); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:  The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 643 (1997); Barbara S. Jones et al., Panel Discussion:  The Prosecutor’s Role in Light of 
Expanding Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657 (1999); Charles D. Bon-
ner, Comment, The Federalization of Crime:  Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
905 (1998). 
 45 We refer to these fifteen states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico collectively as 
“non-death penalty states,” but their respective paths to abolition are different.  Four of 
these states (Michigan, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Maine) abolished the death penalty 
statutorily in the nineteenth century.  See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:  CURRENT 
CONTROVERSIES 9 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).  Minnesota and North Dakota did the 
same in the early twentieth century.  Id.  Five states (Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Vermont, and 
West Virginia) abolished the death penalty decades later in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
Massachusetts abolished the death penalty in 1984.  Id.  Puerto Rico’s Constitution was ra-
tified by Congress in 1952 and proclaims that “[t]he death penalty shall not exist.”  P.R. 
CONST. art. II, § 7.  New Jersey repealed its death penalty in 2007, see Jeremy W. Peters, 
 
64 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
in order “to ensure consistency and fairness” in the application of the 
federal death penalty.46  To be sure, the endeavor for a national stan-
dard is nothing new.  Addressing the Second Annual Conference of 
United States Attorneys in 1940, then-Attorney General Robert Jack-
son declared that “uniformity of policy” was “necessary to the prestige 
of federal law”47: 
The federal government could not enforce one kind of law in one place 
and another kind elsewhere.  It could hardly adopt strict standards for 
loose states or loose standards for strict states without doing violence to 
local sentiment. . . . [T]he only long-term policy that will save federal jus-
tice from being discredited by entanglements with local politics is that it 
confine itself to strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting 
the chips fall in the community where they may. . . . [T]here should be 
no permitting of local considerations to stop federal enforcement . . . .48 
Jackson’s remarks focused on the need for political consistency 
and procedural centralization to cabin prosecutorial discretion, but 
uniformity has remained a concern in other areas of criminal justice, 
particularly sentencing.  Judge Marvin Frankel inspired the creation 
of the United States Sentencing Commission when he pronounced 
that unguided discretion in sentencing had produced “a wasteland in 
the law.”49  About a decade later, Congress responded by enacting the 
 
Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, 
at B3, and New Mexico repealed its death penalty earlier this year.  See supra note 30.  The 
death penalty remains on the books in New York where the Court of Appeals held it to be 
unconstitutional.  See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).  In 2007, the Court 
of Appeals upheld LaValle and ordered the last prisoner on New York’s death row to be 
resentenced.  See People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 2007).  Accordingly, New York is 
included in our count of non-death penalty states. 
 46 Two different Department of Justice spokeswomen invoked the “consistency and fairness” 
defense more than a dozen times over the course of a year.  See, e.g., Matt Burgard, 2 Sus-
pects in Killing Could Face Execution:  Prosecutors Pressured to Seek Death Penalty, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Feb. 7, 2003, at B7 (“‘A process exists . . . . to ensure consistency and fairness 
in the application of the death penalty in all U.S. attorney districts across the country,’ 
Barbara Comstock, the department’s director of pubic affairs, said in a statement.”); Wil-
liam Glaberson, Unlikely Symbol in Death Debate:  The Last Don; U.S. Is Weighing Charges 
Against Old-Style Mafia Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at B1 (“Monica Goodling, a 
spokeswoman for Mr. Ashcroft, . . . said the Justice Department’s ‘process for evaluating 
death-eligible cases is designed to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of 
the death penalty nationwide.’”). 
47  Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen. of the United States, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at 
the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4 (1940). 
 48 Id. at 6. 
 49 Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1972); see John Glee-
son, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment:  Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. 
Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1702 n.17 (2003) 
(“Judge Frankel’s call for a national sentencing commission was a driving force in the 
creation of the United States Sentencing Commission . . . .”). 
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.50  The law sought to avoid “unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.”51  The Act 
not only established the Sentencing Commission, but it also directed 
the Commission to promulgate guidelines that would be uniform in 
application without regard to geography.52  Because the Act predates 
the 1988 restoration of the federal death penalty,53 it does not address 
death sentencing.  However, “[n]othing in the more recent congres-
sional death penalty legislation suggests that Congress has changed 
its intention to have federal criminal punishment administered uni-
formly for similar violations and violators of identical federal stat-
utes.”54  Such silence is golden for the Department of Justice, which 
has said that its “decisions are governed by a desire to see that the 
federal death penalty is applied uniformly around the country.”55 
The pursuit of uniformity in the administration of the federal 
death penalty is part of a larger centralization effort at the Depart-
ment of Justice spearheaded by former Attorney General John Ash-
croft.  In 2003, then Attorney General Ashcroft circulated a directive 
to all federal prosecutors requiring them to “charge and pursue the 
most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported 
by the facts of the case.”56  Under Attorney General Janet Reno and 
before the issuance of the 2003 Ashcroft Memorandum, federal pros-
ecutors were instructed to make an “individualized assessment of the 
extent to which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of 
the case” and to consider a number of factors, including the sentenc-
ing guideline range yielded by the charge, whether the range is pro-
portional to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, and whether 
the charge achieves the purposes of retribution, isolation, deterrence, 
 
 50 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 
U.S.C.). 
 51 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 52 Id. § 991. 
 53 See discussion infra Part III. 
 54 Little, supra note 22, at 536. 
 55 William Glaberson, Capital Cases and Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at B1. 
 56 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All U.S. Att’ys 1 
(Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT. R. 134 (2003), available at 
http://txw.fd.org/pdf_lib/memoagcds.pdf [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum].  For a 
more thorough discussion of the Ashcroft Memorandum’s effect on prosecutorial discre-
tion, see HARRY I. SUBIN, BARRY BERKE, & ERIC TIRSCHWELL, THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW:  PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE § 11.1(d) (2006). 
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and rehabilitation.57  However, the Ashcroft Memorandum elimi-
nated the “discretion of federal prosecutors to inform their charging 
decisions by consideration of [such] factors,”58 and made clear that 
“[m]ajor decisions about prosecutorial priorities at the local and re-
gional level [would] be dictated by the central command in Washing-
ton, not by local U.S. Attorneys.”59  Other commentators have simi-
larly linked the Ashcroft Memorandum to the Department of Justice’s 
pursuit of the federal death penalty, opining that “Ashcroft loves to 
centralize power” and noting that the former Attorney General’s 
“practice” was to “override the decisions of local U.S. Attorneys 
whether to seek the death penalty in individual cases.”60 
In the form of an introduction, Part I of this Article outlined the 
issue by giving a snapshot of the current federal death penalty climate 
and by discussing the implications of federalism and the value of uni-
formity in sentencing.  Part II of this Article will provide a brief his-
tory of the federal death penalty, starting with the enactment of first 
capital federal statutes in 1790.  Part III will discuss the Supreme 
Court’s 1972 ruling in Furman v. Georgia,61 the post-Furman restoration 
of the federal death penalty in 1988, and the dramatic expansion of 
the federal death penalty in 1994.  Part IV will compare the Depart-
ment of Justice’s administration of the federal death penalty under 
former Attorneys General Janet Reno, John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonza-
les, and Michael Mukasey.  Part V will describe how communities in 
non-death penalty states reacted to the federal government’s pursuit 
of capital sentences in their respective jurisdictions and discuss how 
the Department of Justice has overruled and replaced U.S. Attorneys 
who were reluctant to extend the federal death penalty into non-
death penalty states.  Finally, Part VI will explore the potential impact 
of the appointment of Eric Holder as Attorney General on the ad-
ministration of the federal death penalty in non-death penalty states. 
 
 57 Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Holders of U.S. Att’ys’ 
Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. R. 352, 352 (1994) (describing 
the “appropriate” items for consideration by “the attorney for the government”). 
 58 SUBIN ET AL., supra note 56, at § 11.1(d). 
 59 Edward Lazarus, Attorney General Ashcroft’s New Charging, Plea Bargaining, and Sentencing 
Policies:  Though Consideration Is Needed, Criticism Has Been Overstated, FINDLAW, Oct. 2, 
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20031002.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
 60 Id. 
 61 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the death penalty as then-administered ran afoul of the 
Eighth Amendment’s protection against the infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ments). 
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II.  BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 
Whatever else may be said about capital punishment in the United 
States, there is little uncertainty that the death penalty “is explicitly 
contemplated in the Constitution.”62  The Fifth Amendment’s Grand 
Jury Clause says that no person shall be held to answer for a capital 
crime unless first indicted by a grand jury.63  The Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the same Amendment states that no person shall be twice 
“put in jeopardy of life” for the same offense.64  The Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause expressly prohibits the Federal Government from 
depriving a person of life without due process of law.65  Furthermore, 
other parts of the Constitution imply the existence of the death pen-
alty.  For example, Article II gives the President the power to “Grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States.”66  The 
pardon power broadly authorizes the President to grant clemency for 
all sorts of criminal matters,67 but the reprieve power is understood as 
relating specifically to the postponement of executions and commu-
tation of death sentences.68  To be sure, “parts of the Constitution in-
dicate that those who drafted and ratified it contemplated the con-
tinued existence of the death penalty.”69 
Shortly after it convened in 1789, the First Congress provided that 
all capital trials were to take place in “the county where the offence 
was committed.”70  However, Congress did not specify any capital 
crimes until April 1790 when it enacted a mandatory death penalty 
for treason, murder, piracy, forgery, and the rescue of a person con-
victed of a capital crime.71  Benefit of clergy, a common law mecha-
nism by which a first-time offender could receive a more lenient sen-
tence,72 was denied to the condemned,73 and the statutorily prescribed 
 
 62 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (emphasis omitted). 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 67 BANNER, supra note 29, at 234. 
 68 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.) 
 69 BANNER, supra note 29, at 234. 
 70 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88. 
 71 Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8–10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112–19 [hereinafter 1790 Crime 
Bill]. 
 72 See BANNER, supra note 29, at 62–64. 
 73 1790 Crime Bill, supra note 71, § 31. 
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method of execution was “hanging the person convicted by the neck 
until dead.”74 
In 1829, days before leaving office, President John Quincy Adams 
transmitted to Congress a report on how the federal death penalty 
had been employed from 1790 through 1826.75  The report revealed 
that, in the federal death penalty’s first thirty-six years, 138 defen-
dants had been tried for capital offenses and 118 were convicted.76  
Of the forty-five defendants tried for capital murder, thirty-seven of 
them (82%) were convicted.77  Twenty-four were executed (65%), six 
were pardoned (16%), and each of the remaining seven either com-
mitted suicide, died, escaped, or was otherwise “unaccounted for.”78 
Congress published a similar report towards the end of the nine-
teenth century to examine how things had changed since the federal 
death penalty’s earlier years.  To support his legislation calling for 
“the total abolition of the [federal] punishment of death,”79 Con-
gressman Newton M. Curtis assembled the data that made its way into 
the congressional report.  In passing a bill to reduce the number of 
capital crimes, the House Judiciary Committee did indeed rely on 
Curtis’s report, which Congressman Simon Peter Wolverton hailed as 
“probably the most thorough and exhaustive ever made” regarding 
the federal death penalty.80  Curtis’s research revealed that of the 271 
defendants indicted on federal murder charges from 1890 through 
1892, sixty-three were convicted (23%), and only thirteen of those 
sixty-three were executed (21%).81  Going beyond the numbers 
above, Curtis calculated that “[i]n former times in proper cases, 
about 85 per cent of those tried [for capital crimes] were convicted, 
while in recent years the average is less than 20 per cent in the Fed-
eral courts, and still lower in the State courts.”82 
The Curtis report and the conclusions drawn therefrom were in-
fluential in the ultimate success of a bill entitled “An Act To reduce 
the cases in which the penalty of death may be inflicted,”83 which ab-
olished the federal death penalty for all but five categories of crime:  
 
 74 Id. § 33. 
 75 H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 20-146 (1829). 
 76 H.R. REP. NO. 54-108, at 4–5 (1896) (analyzing data from the 1829 report on federal 
death penalty). 
 77 Id. at 5. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Little, supra note 22, at 367 & n.93 (alteration in the original). 
 80 H.R. REP. NO. 53-545, at 2 (1894). 
 81 H.R. REP. NO. 54-108, at 5 (1896). 
 82 Id. at 3. 
 83 Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, §§ 1–5, 29 Stat. 487. 
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murder, rape, treason, crimes subject to Army justice, and crimes sub-
ject to Navy justice.84  Additionally, the new law made the death pen-
alty discretionary, rather than mandatory.85  In upholding that 1897 
law, the Supreme Court explained that providing for a discretionary 
death penalty was a prudent consideration of “the reluctance of ju-
rors to concur in a capital conviction.”86  Forced to condemn to death 
defendants found guilty of any capital offense, juries had engaged in 
a striking pattern of nullification, as demonstrated by the statistics 
calculated by Curtis.87  Some legislatures responded by decreeing that 
only certain degrees of murder could be punished by death, whereas 
other legislatures, such as Congress, allowed juries to “qualify their 
verdict[s] by adding thereto ‘without capital punishment.’”88 
With the number of civilian capital offenses reduced from sixty to 
three,89 and with federal juries empowered to sentence defendants to 
life imprisonment instead of death, it is unsurprising that federal ex-
ecutions in the twentieth century were rare.  From 1900 through 
1963, when the last federal execution of the twentieth century was 
carried out,90 only thirty-nine individuals were put to death as a result 
of a federal conviction.91  Throughout the twentieth century, only 
eight death penalty states executed fewer defendants,92 and five states 
that are currently non-death penalty states executed more.93  Though 
five of the thirty-nine twentieth century federal executions were car-
 
 84 Id. §§ 2–3. 
 85 Id. § 1. 
 86 Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 310 (1899). 
 87 See Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment:  An Historical Note, 
54 B.U. L. REV. 32, 32 (1974) (evaluating the claim that the mandatory death penalty in 
the mid-nineteenth century “made securing convictions more difficult and often resulted 
in the acquittal of obviously guilty defendants”). 
 88 Winston, 172 U.S. at 310–12. 
 89 See H.R. REP. NO. 53-545, at 1 (1894) (introduction to House report accompanying an 
earlier version of the capital crimes reduction legislation, noting that “[a]t this time there 
are sixty offenses for which Federal laws prescribe the death penalty, positively or condi-
tionally”). 
 90 Little, supra note 22, at 355–57. 
 91 Federal, Territorial and Indian Tribunal List, http://users.bestweb.net/~rg/execution/
DATA%20FEDERAL.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
 92 Id.  The nine death penalty states to have executed fewer than thirty-nine people in the 
twentieth century are Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, 
Utah, and Wyoming. 
 93 Id.  The five non-death penalty states to have executed more people in the twentieth cen-
tury than the federal government had executed over the same period are New York (641 
executions), New Jersey (187 executions), West Virginia (91 executions), Massachusetts 
(65 executions), and Hawaii (42 executions).  All of Hawaii’s executions were carried out 
before it obtained statehood in 1950, and all of the other executions were performed be-
fore the pre-Furman death penalty moratorium began in 1967. 
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ried out in three states that do not authorize capital punishment to-
day (Iowa, Michigan, and New York), Michigan was the only state of 
the three that was a non-death penalty jurisdiction at the time of the 
federal execution.94  It is useful to briefly examine that episode be-
cause the anger and confusion that was produced by the prospect of a 
federal execution in a non-death penalty state is the same engen-
dered today under similar circumstances. 
On July 8, 1938, Anthony Chebatoris was executed at the federal 
detention farm in Milan, Michigan for a bank robbery in which a by-
stander was killed.95  Nearly a century prior, Michigan had abolished 
its death penalty statutorily,96 and it had never seen an execution in 
all of its time as a state.97  Then, as now, the people of Michigan were 
strongly opposed to capital punishment and—just seven years before 
Chebatoris’s execution—had soundly defeated a statewide referen-
dum calling for the restoration of the death penalty.98  Perhaps the 
most abolitionist of any state, Michigan is the only state in the Union 
to prohibit capital punishment in its state constitution.99  Of over sixty 
legislative attempts and four petition drives to revive capital punish-
ment in Michigan, none has proven successful.100 
When the federal government brought a capital charge against 
Chebatoris, many Michiganders made their objections known, includ-
ing the widow of Chebatoris’s victim and the victim’s sister-in-law who 
claimed that her dying brother-in-law told her that he wanted Cheba-
toris to be spared in the event of his death.101  Nonetheless, the prose-
cution proceeded, and a federal jury found Chebatoris guilty and 
sentenced him to death after less than a day of deliberation.102  Trou-
 
 94 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 15.  Anthony Chebatoris was executed in Mich-
igan in 1938 although Michigan had abolished the death penalty in 1846.  See supra note 
28 and accompanying text.  The Rosenbergs and Gerhard Puff were electrocuted in New 
York in 1953 and 1954, respectively, but New York was a death penalty state from its in-
ception until the Supreme Court’s 1972 Furman decision and then again from 1995 until 
the New York Court of Appeals’ 2004 LaValle decision.  See supra note 45.  Victor Feguer 
was executed in Iowa in 1963, but Iowa did not abolish the death penalty until 1965.  Id. 
 95 Aaron J. Veselenak, The Execution of Anthony Chebatoris, MICH. HIST., May/June 1998, at 35. 
 96 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 97 Veselenak, supra note 95 (noting that, before Chebatoris’s, the last execution in Michigan 
was in 1830—more than six years before Michigan entered the Union). 
 98 Eugene G. Wanger, Historical Reflections on Michigan’s Abolition of the Death Penalty, 13 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 755, 769 n.86 (1996) (noting that the popular vote was 269,538 for the 
death penalty and 352,594 against it—a difference of fourteen percentage points). 
 99 See MICH. CONST. art IV, § 46. 
100 Scott Davis & Jack Tucker, Michigan History Reveals Similar Tale, SAGINAW NEWS (Mich.), 
June 10, 2001, at 1A. 
101 Veselenak, supra note 95. 
102 Id. 
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bled that federal law demanded that the execution take place in 
Michigan, Governor Frank Murphy appealed to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to move the execution to another state, noting that there 
had not been an execution in Michigan in more than 100 years and 
suggesting that hanging Chebatoris in Michigan would be “like turn-
ing back the clock of civilization.”103  Roosevelt referred the matter to 
the Attorney General who, in turn, asked U.S. District Judge Arthur J. 
Tuttle to determine whether the execution could be moved.  For 
Judge Tuttle, the issues of federalism and supremacy discussed above 
informed his decision to deny the Governor’s request: 
I have neither the power nor the inclination to change the sentence.  If I 
did have the power to do so, I think it would be unfair to suggest that the 
people of a neighboring state are less humane than are the people of our 
own state of Michigan.  This federal court is enforcing a federal law in 
Michigan for an offense against the United States, committed in Michi-
gan.104 
Governor Murphy was less hesitant to impugn the humanity of 
“the people of a neighboring state.”  Outraged at Judge Tuttle’s deci-
sion, Murphy declared: 
I deplore the fact that this execution is taking place within our state, 
where for more than a century there hasn’t been a legal execution.  It 
has always seemed to me that Michigan could take pride in being the first 
commonwealth on this earth to abolish capital punishment.  I don’t 
think it against the interests of the people of this state to oppose its re-
vival by having the federal government come in here, erect a scaffold and 
hang a man by the neck until he is dead. . . . I think the federal govern-
ment should have arranged for the execution elsewhere—if it was to take 
place anywhere.105 
Murphy then compared Illinois to a “neighbor [who] was in the habit 
of chloroforming dogs in his backyard” and suggested that it would 
be more appropriate for Chebatoris to be executed by such a neigh-
bor because “one more or less probably wouldn’t disturb him.”106 
It is significant that Murphy accepted the federal government’s 
authority to try, convict, and punish Chebatoris; his objection was re-
served for the venue of the execution.  Today, federal law addresses 
this matter by pronouncing that when a federal death sentence is to 
be implemented, the execution should be done “in the manner pre-
scribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed” un-
less that State “does not provide for implementation of a sentence of 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105  Id. (alteration in original). 
106 Id. 
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death,” in which case the sentencing judge must designate a death 
penalty state in which the execution is to be carried out.107  This pro-
vision makes clear that which both Judge Tuttle and Governor Mur-
phy recognized:  the federal government may enforce the federal 
laws, including those laws that make certain federal offenses punish-
able by death, notwithstanding local opposition.  At the same time, 
insofar as it eliminates the possibility that a federal execution could 
be carried out in a non-death penalty state, that law, 18 U.S.C. § 3596, 
demonstrates Congress’s respectful recognition that certain commu-
nities may be opposed to capital punishment and avoids situations 
similar to that of Chebatoris’s execution in an abolitionist state. 
The Chebatoris episode is also significant for the purposes of this 
paper because it demonstrates how federal officials may enforce un-
popular capital statutes in order to service a particular political agen-
da.  Chebatoris was prosecuted under the Federal Bank Robbery Act 
of 1934,108 a relatively new federal law that was enacted in response to 
nationwide requests for “Federal relief” from “organized gangsters” 
who were considered “sufficiently powerful and well equipped to defy 
local police.”109  Though the local police had no trouble catching 
Chebatoris—he was arrested by the county sheriff and held at the 
county jail—the federal government made him the test case for the 
Bank Robbery Act.110  This can be better understood taking into ac-
count the fact that the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Chebatoris was 
a former congressman who had served on the committee that drafted 
the Federal Bank Robbery Act of 1934,111 as well as the fact that, 
though the Act explicitly granted states concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute bank robbers in state court,112 the death penalty could be 
obtained only in federal court. 
In the twentieth century, Chebatoris was the only person executed 
by the federal government in a non-death penalty state.  Since Cheba-
toris’s hanging, no other federal inmate from a non-death penalty 
state has been executed, however, seven of the fifty-five defendants 
currently awaiting federal execution are from non-penalty states.113 
 
107 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (2006). 
108 Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, 48 Stat. 783. 
109 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1461, at 2 (1934). 
110 Veselenak, supra note 95. 
111 Id. 
112 Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, § 4, 48 Stat. 783, 783. 
113 See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 13; FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, 
supra note 39 (listing nine condemned inmates from non-death penalty states but failing 
to account for the fact that a new trial was ordered earlier this year for defendants George 
Lecco and Valerie Friend in United States v. Lecco, No. 2:05-00107, 2009 WL 1249287 (S.D. 
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III.  THE MODERN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY—POST-FURMAN / PRE-
ASHCROFT 
A few months after the federal government executed Victor Fe-
guer in 1963,114 Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote an 
opinion in which he questioned the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.115  Taking a cue from Justice Goldberg’s opinion and in an 
effort to create “death row logjam,”116 the Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund of the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (“NAACP”) began to attack the constitutionality of the 
death penalty in a series of lawsuits, eventfully halting all executions 
in the United States by 1967.117  In 1972, the Supreme Court held in 
Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty as then-administered violated 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, effec-
tively eliminating capital punishment nationwide.118  In particular, the 
Supreme Court took issue with the “untrammeled discretion” pos-
sessed by juries “to let an accused live or insist that he die.”119 
Though the precise ramifications of the Furman decision on the 
federal death penalty were debatable given that certain federal pro-
cedures were different than those spelled out in the Georgia statute 
invalidated by the Supreme Court, insofar as a federal capital statute 
granted juries unguided discretion to return death verdicts, Furman 
was an insuperable barrier.120  As Congress recognized in 1974, “the 
practical effect of the Furman case is that the death penalty is not pre-
sently available for the enforcement of . . . Federal crimes.”121 
In an effort to address the problem outlined in Furman regarding 
untrammeled discretion, Congress enacted an air piracy law two years 
after the Supreme Court’s decision that indicated that the death pe-
nalty was to be mandatory if the jury found any one of a number of 
statutorily-defined aggravating factors.122  However, in 1976, the Su-
 
W. Va. May 4, 2009)).  Coincidentally, the first of the nine federal defendants to be sen-
tenced to death in a non-death penalty state was a Michigander, Marvin Gabrion. 
114 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 15. 
115 Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
116 Christopher Q. Cutler, Comment, Death Resurrected:  The Reimplementation of the Federal 
Death Penalty, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1189, 1195–96 (2000). 
117 See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:  CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 45, at 184–85. 
118 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
119 Id. at 247–48 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
120 Id. 
121 H.R. REP. NO. 93-885 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981. 
122 See Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409; see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-
885 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981 (“The death penalty must be im-
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preme Court held that mandatory death sentencing schemes were no 
less offensive to the Constitution than fully discretionary schemes.123  
The air piracy statute was therefore likely unconstitutional, but, be-
cause the federal government never prosecuted anyone under the 
1974 version of the law, its validity was never tested in the courts.  Si-
milarly, when Congress sought to make the murder of a witness a cap-
ital offense in 1986 by cross-referencing it with the federal murder 
statute that retained a pre-Furman, “open discretion” death penalty 
procedure, that attempt also yielded a product of dubious legality 
and one that also was never tested.124 
In 1988, in the midst of the so-called “War on Drugs,” Congress 
added a death penalty provision to the continuing criminal enter-
prise (“CCE”) statute and enacted detailed death penalty procedures 
designed to respond directly to the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
rulings since Furman.125  Congress’s attempt to craft a death penalty 
 
posed if any one of the aggravating factors set forth in the reported bill is found to exist 
and none of the mitigating factors is found.”). 
123 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that adoption of mandatory 
death penalty does not eliminate constitutional deficiencies arising from unbridled jury 
discretion in the imposition of capital punishment); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 
325 (1976) (same). 
124 See Little, supra note 22, at 379. 
125 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387.  The fol-
lowing table shows how the CCE statute addressed the Supreme Court’s death penalty 
precedents: 
Death Penalty 
Procedure 
Section of CCE 
Statute 
Supreme Court 
 Precedent 
Bifurcated guilt/penalty proceedings § 848(i)(1) Gregg v. Georgia,  
428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
Eligibility for death penalty limited 
to offenders who intentionally kill or 
cause an intentional killing 
§ 848(n)(1) 
Tison v. Arizona,  
481 U.S. 137 (1987) 
Eligibility for death penalty limited 
to offenders against whom at least 
one statutorily specified aggravating 
factor is unanimously found 
§ 848(j); 
§ 848(n)(2)–
(12) 
Gregg v. Georgia,  
428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
Jury must consider mitigating factors 
without limit to specified list 
§ 848(j); 
§ 848(m) 
Lockett v. Ohio,  
438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
Mitigating factors do not need to be 
found unanimously 
§ 848(k) Mills v. Maryland,  
486 U.S. 367 (1988) 
Jury must be instructed that a death 
sentence is never required 
§ 848(k) Woodson v. North Carolina,  
7 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
Mentally insane offenders may not 
be executed 
§ 848(l) Ford v. Wainwright,  
477 U.S. 399 (1986) 
Offenders younger than 18 may not 
be executed 
§ 848(l) Thompson v. Oklahoma,  
487 U.S. 815 (1988) 
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statute that would meet constitutional muster was successful, and, 
within three years, David Ronald Chandler became the first person 
sentenced to death in a federal court in nearly forty years.126  Since 
then, the CCE statute and its death penalty procedures have with-
stood numerous constitutional challenges.127 
On September 13, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,128 which contained 
twenty-six death penalty-related sections that collectively made up the 
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (“FDPA”).129  In addition to provid-
ing possible death penalties for more than a dozen preexisting fed-
eral offenses and nearly a dozen new federal offenses,130 FDPA 
breathed new life into fifteen so-called “zombie statutes” that con-
tained pre-Furman death penalty authorizations that were likely un-
constitutional by prescribing new “constitutional procedures for the 
imposition of the sentence of death.”131  Though “the exact number 
of federal offenses made death-eligible by [FDPA] is ‘open to inter-
pretation’” because some provisions of the United States Code con-
tain more than one death-eligible offense, there is no doubt that 
“FDPA substantially increased the availability of the death penalty for 
federal offenders.”132 
 
 
The citations to the United States Code in the table above correspond to the 1994 edi-
tion, thus they are no longer current.  The special CCE death penalty procedures provi-
sions were eliminated from the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 848 in 2006, see USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 221, 
120 Stat. 192, 231 (2006), but they are detailed above to show at what lengths Congress 
sought to resurrect the federal death penalty with a statute that could pass constitutional 
muster. 
126 See United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding Chandler’s 
1991 conviction and the constitutionality of the CCE death penalty procedures). 
127 See Little, supra note 22, at 384 n.205. 
128 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. 
129 Id. §§ 60001–60026, 108 Stat. 1959–82. 
130 See id. §§ 60005–60024; Little, supra note 22, at 389 n.232. 
131 Id. § 60002.  Among these procedures is the provision discussed above that authorizes 
district courts to transfer the venue of a federal execution from a non-death penalty state 
to a death penalty state.  That provision makes clear Congress’s intent for the federal 
criminal laws to be enforceable in all states—even if a defendant would need to be pun-
ished for violating those laws in a district other than the one in which he was convicted.  
See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
132 Little, supra note 22, at 389–91 (quoting Charles Kenneth Eldred, Recent Developments, The 
New Federal Death Penalties, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 293 n.2 (1994)).  Additionally, in 1996, 
Congress expanded the availability of the death penalty to four terrorism-related crimes.  
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214.  As of the printing of the 2000 Department of Justice statistical survey, see supra note 
3 and accompanying text, there were nearly sixty capital crimes under federal law:  Mur-
der of officials enforcing laws relating to transportation, sale, and handling of certain an-
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The Federal Death Penalty Act was a Democratic initiative, intro-
duced by then-Senator, now-Vice President Joseph Biden.133  FDPA, 
and the omnibus crime bill of which it was a part, was designed to 
dispel the belief that Democrats generally (and President Clinton 
 
imals, 7 U.S.C. § 2146 (1994); Bringing in and harboring certain aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 
(1994); Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to the protection of horses, 15 U.S.C. § 
1825 (1994); Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1994); Destruc-
tion of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities, 18 U.S.C. § 33 (1994); Drive-by shoot-
ing, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994); Violence at international airports, 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994); In-
fluencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by a family member, 18 
U.S.C. § 115 (1994); Chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 229A (Supp. IV 1998); Conspiracy 
against rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994); Deprivation of rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242 (1994); Federally protected activities, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994); Damage to religious 
property; obstruction of the free exercise of religious rights, 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1994); Con-
gressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1994); Gathering 
or delivering defense information to aid foreign government, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); Ex-
plosive materials, 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); Firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1994); Possession of 
firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities, 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994); Genocide, 
18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994); Murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994); Protection of officers and em-
ployees of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994); Murder of foreign officials, official 
guests, or internationally protected persons, 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994); Murder by a Fed-
eral prisoner, 18 U.S.C. § 1118 (1994); Foreign murder of United States nationals, 18 
U.S.C. § 1119 (1994); Murder by escaped prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 1120 (1994); Killing per-
sons aiding Federal investigations or State correctional officers, 18 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994); 
Kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); Hostage taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994); Influenc-
ing or injuring officer or juror generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994); Tampering with a wit-
ness, victim, or an informant, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994); Retaliating against a witness, vic-
tim, or an informant, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (1994); Injurious articles as nonmailable, 18 
U.S.C. § 1716 (1994); Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 
(1994); Use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, 18 
U.S.C. § 1958 (1994); Violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 
(1994); Wrecking trains, 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1994); Bank robbery and incidental crimes, 18 
U.S.C. § 2113 (1994); Motor vehicles (carjacking), 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994); Aggravated 
sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994); Sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (1994); Sexual 
abuse of a minor or ward, 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994); Abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2244 (1994); Sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994); Violence against 
maritime navigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1994); Violence against maritime fixed platforms, 
18 U.S.C. § 2281 (1994); Homicide, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1994); Use of weapons of mass de-
struction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (1994); Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b (Supp. II 1996); Use of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 2332c (Supp. II 
1996); Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994); Treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994); War crimes, 
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. II 1996); Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to poultry in-
spection, 21 U.S.C. § 461 (1994); Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to meat in-
spection, 21 U.S.C. § 675 (1994); Continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994); 
Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to inspection of egg products, 21 U.S.C. § 1041 
(1994); Murder of nuclear inspectors, 42 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994); Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 46502 (1994). 
133 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, S. 1607, 103d Cong. tit. II 
(1993).  Indeed, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, of which FDPA 
was a part, was known popularly as the “Biden Crime Bill.”  See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Press 
Conference (Mar. 11, 2009) (“I wrote what used to be called the Biden Crime Bill back in 
the ’90s . . . it had my name on it . . . .”). 
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particularly) were soft on crime.134  On the Senate Floor, Senator 
John Kerry of Massachusetts boasted that the Democratic crime bill 
was “overwhelmingly tougher” than past Republican efforts, noting 
that the bill added “60 new death penalties . . . the largest expansion 
of the Federal death penalty in the history of the U.S. Congress.”135  
Similarly, during his reelection campaign, President Clinton stated, 
“[m]y 1994 crime bill expanded the death penalty for drug kingpins, 
murderers of federal law enforcement officers, and nearly 60 addi-
tional categories of violent felons.”136  On August 25, 1994, all but two 
Democratic senators voted in favor of the crime bill,137 clearing 
FDPA’s path to the White House and breathing new life into the fed-
eral death penalty that had been dormant for more than three dec-
ades. 
IV.  THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL 
DEATH PENALTY 
Shortly after the passage of FDPA and with more than fifty capital 
offenses suddenly in the Department of Justice’s arsenal, Attorney 
General Janet Reno took on the task of establishing internal Depart-
ment procedures to govern the selection and prosecution of capital 
cases.  On January 27, 1995, Reno amended the U.S. Attorneys’ Man-
ual to add a nine-part section regarding “Federal Prosecutions in 
Which the Death Penalty May Be Sought.”138  Collectively, these 
amendments came to be known as the “Death Penalty Protocol.”139  
The Protocol made clear that, unlike most prosecutorial decisions, 
the decision of whether to seek the death penalty was to be central-
ized in Washington, declaring that “[t]he death penalty shall not be 
sought without the prior written authorization of the Attorney Gen-
 
134 See Eldred, supra note 132, at 294–96 (stating that Congress members did not clearly ex-
press their intent in passing the Act, but that they did “make broad arguments to the ef-
fect that it [was] self-evident that the death penalty [was] tough on crime”). 
135 140 CONG. REC. 23,929, 23,961–62 (1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry). 
136 On the Issues:  Death Penalty, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 8, 1996, at 4A. 
137 140 CONG. REC. 24,114, 24,114–15 (1994).  The two Democratic senators to oppose the 
crime bill were Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, who joined the Republican Party two 
months after the vote, see Alabama Senator Makes Switch to Republican Party, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Nov. 9, 1994, at A1, and Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin who felt “com-
pelled” to vote against the bill “because of the absurd extension of the death penalty with 
no real gain coming from it, and because of the greatly increased dangerous trend for fe-
deralization of law enforcement.”  140 CONG. REC. 23,802 (1994). 
138 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.000 (1995), available at 
http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/shared_files/docs/01a_doj_manual.htm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 1995 DOJ Protocol]. 
139 Little, supra note 22, at 407. 
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eral.”140  A U.S. Attorney who intended to charge a defendant with a 
capital offense was directed to prepare a “Death Penalty Evaluation” 
form and prosecution memorandum to be reviewed by a committee 
at Main Justice.141  These procedures were established to “promote 
consistency and fairness” in the administration of the federal death 
penalty.142 
The Capital Case Review Committee at Main Justice was charged 
with considering “all information presented to it, including any evi-
dence of racial bias against the defendant or evidence that the De-
partment has engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimina-
tion in the administration of the federal death penalty.”143  To the 
extent feasible, submissions received from the local prosecutor were 
required to be devoid of information that could potentially identify 
the races of either defendants or victims.144  Defendants whose cases 
were being considered were not limited in what sort of information 
they could submit to the Committee, and the Protocol required that 
defense counsel “be provided an opportunity to present to the Com-
mittee, orally or in writing, the reasons why the death penalty should 
not be sought.”145  After considering all of the information submitted, 
the Committee would make a recommendation to the Attorney Gen-
eral, who would make the ultimate decision whether to file a notice 
of intention to seek the death penalty,146 pursuant to the new FDPA 
procedures.147 
In determining whether the government should seek the death 
penalty, all relevant parties in the Department were directed to per-
form the same function that a capital jury would ultimately be asked 
to perform, namely determining “whether the statutory aggravating 
factors applicable to the offense and any non-statutory aggravating 
factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors applicable to the 
offense to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of any miti-
gating factors, whether the aggravating factors themselves are suffi-
cient to justify a sentence of death.”148  The weighing of factors was to 
be “qualitative, not quantitative,” and “any mitigating factor reasona-
 
140 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(A). 
141 Id. § 9-10.000(C).  The Department of Justice’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. is 
known as “Main Justice.”  Little, supra note 22, at 351 n.13. 
142 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(G). 
143 Id. § 9-10.000(D). 
144 Little, supra note 22, at 411–12 & n.348. 
145 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(D). 
146 Id. 
147 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2006). 
148 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(G). 
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bly raised by the evidence [would] be considered in the light most fa-
vorable to the defendant” due to the likelihood that little or no evi-
dence of mitigating factors would be available at the time of the De-
partment’s review.149 
Most significant to this Article is the part of the Protocol requiring 
the Department to evaluate whether a “substantial federal interest” 
justified federal, rather than stateside, prosecution in cases where the 
defendant could be prosecuted by either the Department of Justice 
or by local officials.150  Among the factors to be considered were:  (1) 
the relative strength of the State’s interest in prosecution; (2) the ex-
tent to which the criminal activity reached beyond the boundaries of 
a single local prosecutorial jurisdiction; and (3) the relative likeli-
hood of effective stateside prosecution.151  The Protocol explicitly di-
rected that “[i]n states where the imposition of the death penalty is 
not authorized by law the fact that the maximum federal penalty is 
death is insufficient, standing alone, to show a more substantial inter-
est in federal prosecution.”152  Accordingly, the Protocol recognized 
that the federal death penalty could apply in a non-death penalty 
state, but declared that the mere availability of the death penalty 
should not dictate whether a case should be prosecuted federally. 
Under the 1995 Protocol, Attorney General Reno considered 
whether to bring capital charges against 588 defendants.153  Authori-
zation was granted for 159 defendants (27%), but only twelve (2%) 
were to be tried in a federal district located in a non-death penalty 
state.154  For three of those twelve defendants, the U.S. Attorney sub-
mitted a recommendation against seeking the death penalty, but 
both the Review Committee and the Attorney General disagreed and 
granted authorization despite the U.S. Attorney’s negative recom-
mendation.155  However, under the 1995 Protocol, a U.S. Attorney 
could avoid a contrary decision from the Attorney General by enter-
 
149 Id. 
150 Id. § 9-10.000(F). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-200–T-203. 
154 Id.  Additionally, authorizations were granted for three defendants in Washington, D.C. 
and thirteen defendants in Puerto Rico, both of which are non-death penalty jurisdic-
tions. 
155 Id. at T-332–T-335.  Of the three defendants for whom Attorney General Reno required a 
death penalty prosecution, two were indicted in the Southern District of Iowa and one 
was indicted in the District of Vermont.  After Reno made the decision to authorize the 
death penalty in those cases, all three defendants engaged in plea bargaining with the 
U.S. Attorney and pled guilty in exchange for life sentences.  See infra notes 156–59 and 
accompanying text. 
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ing into a plea agreement with the defendant that would dispose of 
the case even after the Attorney General had made her decision.156  
Indeed, due to the availability of plea bargaining under the 1995 Pro-
tocol, most of the federal capital cases authorized in non-death pen-
alty states never went to trial.  Out of twelve defendants, five pled 
guilty in exchange for life sentences,157 and charges against five others 
were dismissed.158  Only two defendants went to trial in non-death pe-
nalty states, and both were sentenced to life imprisonment after the 
juries declined to return death verdicts.159 
Despite the fact that each of the Department’s attempts to obtain 
a death sentence in a non-death penalty state under the 1995 Proto-
col had proven futile, members of Congress from non-death penalty 
states realized that federal law could introduce capital punishment in 
jurisdictions that had chosen to abolish it.  In the 106th Congress, 
Congressman William Delahunt of Massachusetts introduced the In-
nocence Protection Act of 2000—legislation that, in most circum-
stances, would have prohibited the Federal Government from seeking 
the death penalty in a non-death penalty state.160  Though Congress-
 
156 See 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, at § 9-10.000(I); see also Little, supra note 22, at 419 
(“[A]lthough the protocols appear to seek to bring within the purview of Main Justice all 
cases from all U.S. Attorneys’ offices across the country ‘in which the death penalty may 
be sought,’ even if the U.S. Attorney does not wish to seek it, they do not prevent the U.S. 
Attorney from unilaterally dispensing with the penalty by plea once the case is filed.”). 
157 FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES ENDING IN A GUILTY PLEA 1–
22, http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/Guilty_Plea.pdf. 
158 In four of the five cases, the district judge held that the prosecution could not seek the 
death penalty for legal reasons.  FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL 
DEFENDANTS WHO WERE DISMISSED BY THE JUDGE FOR LEGAL REASONS 1–3, 
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Dismissals%20by%20Judge.pdf.  In one 
case, the government moved to dismiss the indictment after additional evidence was un-
covered exculpating the defendant and inculpating two individuals who were charged 
subsequently.  FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL PROSECUTIONS WHO 
WERE NOT FOUND GUILTY OF THE CAPITAL CHARGE OR WERE INNOCENT 2, 
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Acquittal%20Innocent.pdf. 
159 FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES ENDING IN A LIFE SENTENCE 
2–17, http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/Life_Sentences.pdf. 
160 H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. § 401(a) (2000).  The bill would have added a § 3599 to Title 18 
of the United States Code: 
“Sec. 3599. Accommodation of State interests; certification requirement 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Gov-
ernment shall not seek the death penalty in any case initially brought before a dis-
trict court of the United States that sits in a State that does not prescribe, author-
ize, or permit the imposition of such penalty for the alleged conduct, except upon 
the certification in writing of the Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney 
General that— 
(1) the State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over 
the defendant with respect to the alleged conduct; 
(2) the State has requested that the Federal Government assume jurisdic-
tion; or 
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man Delahunt’s bill never made it out of committee, it was cospon-
sored by congressmen from all but two non-death penalty states.  
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a companion bill in 
the Senate that contained a similar provision, and though it too en-
joyed support from the representatives of other non-death penalty 
states, it also failed to make it out of committee.161  Delahunt and 
Leahy tried again, unsuccessfully, in the 107th Congress.162  In fact, 
although Leahy’s bill made it out of committee in 2002, the language 
limiting the reach of the federal death penalty was struck by the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee before the bill reached the Senate floor.163  
There is little doubt that Delahunt and Leahy took a particular inter-
est in this matter as a result of the Attorney General’s 1999 decision 
to authorize capital prosecutions in both Massachusetts164 and Ver-
mont.165 
Attorney General Reno’s tenure at the Department of Justice 
ended in January 2001 with the inauguration of President George W. 
Bush.  Bush appointed John Ashcroft, a staunchly conservative death 
penalty proponent, to lead the Department of Justice.166  Shortly after 
taking office, Ashcroft decided to revise the 1995 Protocol in order to 
have “greater consistency in all aspects of the application of the fed-
eral death penalty.”167  Three changes were particularly significant re-
garding the operation of the federal death penalty in non-death pen-
alty states:  (1) all potential capital cases had to be submitted to Main 
Justice, even if the U.S. Attorney did not intend to seek the death 
 
(3) the offense charged is an offense described in section 32, 229, 351, 794, 
1091, 1114, 1118, 1203, 1751, 1992, 2340A, or 2381, or chapter 113B. 
(b) STATE DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘State’ means each of the several 
States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and pos-
sessions of the United States.” 
161 Innocence Protection Act of 2000, S. 2690, 106th Cong. § 401(a) (2000). 
162 Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001); Innocence Protection 
Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001). 
163 S. 486, 107th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 16, 2002). 
164 See Shelley Murphy & B.J. Roche, Former Nurse May Face Death Penalty in Hospital Slayings, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 1999, at A1 (noting that it was the nurse’s “alleged cruelty and 
cunning that persuaded US Attorney General Janet Reno to recommend a death sen-
tence for the first time in a federal case in Massachusetts”). 
165 See Thomas Farragher, Vt. Debates Life-or-Death Row Matter, BOSTON GLOBE, at B1 (“Thirty-
four years after Vermont banned capital punishment, the federal government announced 
last month that it would seek the death penalty against [a defendant in a pipe-bombing 
trial].”). 
166 See Nick Anderson, Conservative Ashcroft Respected in Senate, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, 
at 27 (noting that Ashcroft “ardently supports” the death penalty). 
167 Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System, supra note 6, at 16 
(statement of Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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penalty;168 (2) U.S. Attorneys were stripped of the ability to dispose of 
potentially capital cases by plea bargain without approval from the At-
torney General;169 and (3) the section of the Protocol stating that the 
absence of a stateside death penalty would not, by itself, justify a fed-
eral capital prosecution was stricken.170  In fact, the new Protocol de-
clared that “[t]he decision whether there is a more substantial inter-
est in Federal, as opposed to State, prosecution of the offense may 
take into account any factor that reasonably bears on the relative in-
terests of the State and Federal Government” and noted that the 
“relative likelihood of . . . appropriate punishment upon conviction in 
the State and Federal jurisdictions should be considered.”171 
When the Protocol was amended six years later by Attorney Gen-
eral Alberto Gonzales, the Department was even more explicit in its 
abandonment of the 1995 guidance against considering the non-
availability of a stateside death penalty during the review process.  At 
the outset, the new Protocol explained that each decision to seek or 
not to seek the death penalty “must be based upon the facts and law 
applicable to the case and be set within a framework of consistent and even-
handed national application of Federal capital sentencing laws,”172 and all 
determinations were to be made with an eye towards “national consis-
tency”: 
National consistency requires treating similar cases similarly, when the 
only material difference is the location of the crime.  Reviewers in each 
district are understandably most familiar with local norms or practice in 
their district and State, but reviewers must also take care to contextualize 
a given case within national norms or practice.  For this reason, the multi-
tier process used to make determinations . . . is carefully designed to pro-
 
168 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.040 (2001), available at 
http://www.capdefnet.org/htm_library/protocols_new.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) 
[hereinafter 2001 DOJ Protocol] (requiring submissions “[i]n all cases in which the Unit-
ed States Attorney intends to recommend filing a notice of intention to seek the death 
penalty” and also “[i]n every case in which a United States Attorney has obtained an in-
dictment charging an offense that is punishable by death or conduct that could be 
charged as an offense punishable by death, but in which the United States Attorney does 
not intend to request authorization to seek the death penalty”). 
169 Id. § 9-10.100 (“Once the Attorney General has authorized the United States Attorney to 
seek the death penalty, the United States Attorney may not enter into a plea agreement 
that requires withdrawal of the notice of intention to seek the death penalty without the 
prior approval of the Attorney General.”). 
170 See id. § 9-10.070; cf. 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(F). 
171 2001 DOJ Protocol, supra note 168, § 9-10.070 (emphases added). 
172 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.030 (2007) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
10mcrm.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 2007 DOJ Protocol]. 
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vide reviewers with access to the national decision-making context, and 
thereby, to reduce disparities across districts.173 
Furthermore, in December 2007, the Department told Congress that 
the goal of its death penalty review and decision-making process was 
“nationwide consistency in the fair and even-handed application of 
federal capital sentencing laws in appropriate cases, irrespective of geog-
raphy or local predisposition for or against the death penalty.”174 
The emphasis on nationwide consistency marked a significant 
change in the guiding tenets of the Department’s review process.  At-
torney General Reno accepted the possibility of incongruous applica-
tion of the federal death penalty when she forbade capital prosecu-
tions in non-death penalty states merely because the death penalty 
would not have been available under state law.  Even during Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s tenure, the Department declared that “geographic 
‘disparities’ are neither avoidable nor undesirable.”175  In fact, the 
Department stated that regional and local considerations should be 
considered by U.S. Attorneys, even if uniformity would suffer: 
There is nothing illegitimate about a district focusing on the actual needs 
of the geographic area for which it is responsible in decisions about the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction.  Rather, a U.S. Attorney who failed to do 
so would be derelict in his or her basic responsibilities.  To the extent 
that this results in varying numbers of federal capital cases among the 
districts, it is no different than, nor any more objectionable than, the 
‘disparities’ among the districts which occur equally in non-capital cas-
es.176 
Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of Ashcroft and Gonzales’s 
changes to the Protocol was to increase the number of cases being 
submitted to Main Justice for review, further concentrate decision-
making power in Washington, and reverse the Department’s policy of 
general deference to non-death penalty states.  As the 2001 revision 
also made clear, United States Attorneys could no longer expect def-
erence with regard to their recommendations to seek or to not seek 
the death penalty; the official commentary to the amended Protocol 
noted that “[t]he Attorney General will, of course, retain legal au-
thority as head of the Justice Department to determine . . . that the 
 
173 Id. § 9-10.130 (emphasis added). 
174 Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, to Senator Russell D. Feingold, Chairman, Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
15–16 (December 17, 2007) (on file with author) (emphasis added). 
175 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9. 
176 Id. 
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death penalty is an appropriate punishment, notwithstanding the 
United States Attorney’s view that it should not be pursued.”177 
As a consequence of the new protocols, the rate of disagreement 
between the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorneys swelled.  In 562 
cases out of 588, Attorney General Reno either agreed with the U.S. 
Attorney’s recommendation not to seek the death penalty or inde-
pendently declined to grant authorization to seek the death penalty, 
thereby requiring a capital prosecution for only twenty-six defendants 
(4.4%).178  As the following table demonstrates, that rate of disagree-
ment was significantly higher under Attorneys General Ashcroft and 
Gonzales in four of the six years following implementation of the 
2001 Protocol179: 
 
Year(s) 
Attorney  
General 
Total  
Defendants 
Capital 
Prosecution 
Required 
Disagree-
ment 
Rate 
1995–
2000 
Reno 588 26 4.4% 
2001 Ashcroft 183 15 8.2% 
2002 Ashcroft 201 17 8.5% 
2003 Ashcroft 181 13 7.2% 
2004 Ashcroft 210 4 1.9% 
2005 Gonzales 191 3 1.6% 
2006 Gonzales 274 21 7.7% 
2001–
2006 
Ashcroft/ 
Gonzales 
1240 73 5.9% 
 
Despite the fact that 2004 and 2005 were outlier years in which 
“the number of ‘overrule’ decisions were unusually low,”180 the aver-
 
177 Id. 
178 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-200–T-203, T-332–T-335. 
179 Official data for the Ashcroft, Gonzales, and Mukasey years have not yet been publicly 
released.  The numbers above for 2001 through 2006 were provided in the Department’s 
responses to certain Congressional oversight questions two years ago.  See Oversight of the 
Federal Death Penalty:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 50–51 (2007) [hereinafter Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty] (Department 
of Justice responses to pre-hearing questions); see also Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, 
supra note 174, at 8–9, 54–56. 
180 Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 174, at 22–23.  The Department did not 
offer any explanation for why the number of overrules was “unusually low” in 2004 and 
2005, but it suggested that these statistics may be “misleading if not viewed in context.”  
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age disagreement rate during the six years that the Department of 
Justice was led by Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales was 
33.1% higher than that during the six post-FDPA years that the De-
partment was led by Attorney General Reno. 
Furthermore, the number of federal capital prosecutions in non-
death penalty states more than doubled under the 2001 Protocol.  In 
the six years that the 1995 Protocol was in effect, Attorney General 
Reno authorized twelve capital prosecutions in non-death penalty 
states.181  In the six years between 2001 and 2006, the Department of 
Justice sought the death penalty for twenty-six defendants in non-
death penalty states—an increase of 117%.182  However, under the 
2001 Protocol, U.S. Attorneys in non-death penalty states were no 
longer able to dispose of any of those twenty-six cases through plea 
bargaining the way that their predecessors had disposed of nearly half 
of the pre-2001 caseload.183  Accordingly, more of these cases went to 
trial, and death sentences were returned for eight defendants.184  
When the first defendant of the eight was sentenced in 2002,185 it be-
came possible—for the first time since Anthony Chebatoris’s 1938 
hanging—that a defendant convicted of a crime in a non-death pen-
alty state would be executed by the federal government. 
V.  COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO FEDERAL INTRUSION 
The federal government’s introduction of the death penalty into 
non-death penalty jurisdictions and the Department of Justice’s ex-
plicit disregard for local opposition to capital punishment have pro-
voked significant resentment in non-death penalty jurisdictions.  With 
the exception of Massachusetts and New York where the death pen-
alty was struck down by the courts,186 every other non-death penalty 
 
The number of overrules in 2004 may have been impacted by Attorney General Ashcroft 
having to relinquish his duties for most of March 2004 due to illness, and the numbers in 
2005 may have been affected by the transition of power from Attorney General Ashcroft 
to Attorney General Gonzales in February of that year.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft Resumes Duties (Mar. 31, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04_ag_201.htm; Media Advisory, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales to Begin First Day at Department 
of Justice (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/
February/05_ag_044.htm. 
181 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-200–T-203. 
182 See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 174, at 20. 
183 See 2001 DOJ Protocol, supra note 168, § 9-10.100. 
184 See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 174, at 20. 
185 See White, supra note 38 (describing the sentencing of Marvin Gabrion). 
186 See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); People v. LaValle, 817 
N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). 
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jurisdiction in the United States has affirmatively declared itself a 
death penalty-free zone.  However, the federalization of capital pun-
ishment and the supremacy of federal law make it impossible to stop 
capital prosecutions in non-death penalty states; the most that the 
states can do is force the federal government to transfer condemned 
defendants to a death penalty state for execution.187 
The prevalence of capital punishment in the United States is 
strongly correlated with geography.  For the most part, the death pe-
nalty is a regional phenomenon.  The two multi-district federal cir-
cuits in which the death penalty is most common are the Fifth Circuit 
and the Eleventh Circuit, both of which are located in the south-
east.188  The six states that make up the two circuits—Alabama, Geor-
gia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—have collectively exe-
cuted 633 people since 1976, thereby accounting for more than half 
of the executions nationwide in the post-Furman era.189  Each of the 
 
187 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (2006) (“When the sentence is to be implemented, the Attorney 
General shall release the person sentenced to death to the custody of a United States 
marshal, who shall supervise implementation of the sentence in the manner prescribed 
by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed.  If the law of the State does not 
provide for implementation of a sentence of death, the court shall designate another 
State, the law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, and 
the sentence shall be implemented in the latter State in the manner prescribed by such 
law.”).  Courts have recognized that § 3596 “does not set forth specific factors for a court 
to consider in designating a state for the implementation of a death sentence.”  See, e.g., 
United States v. Fell, No. 2:01-CR-12-1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40578, at *5 (D. Vt. June 16, 
2006).  However, in coming to the conclusion that New York would be the most appro-
priate venue for defendant Fell’s execution with Indiana as the second-most appropriate 
venue, the Fell court relied on considerations expressed in an earlier decision from the 
District in Massachusetts in which New Hampshire was designated as the state of execu-
tion.  See United States v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Mass. 2004).  In both cases, 
the Federal Government had requested that Indiana be selected as the execution state 
because the Bureau of Prisons has established a death row at the U.S. Penitentiary in 
Terre Haute.  However, though the Attorney General may imprison convicts at whatever 
facility he or she chooses, § 3596 leaves it to the court to decide where the execution shall 
take place.  See Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 280.  The prevailing considerations in Sampson 
and Fell were:  (1) the interest in ensuring that to the extent possible, all litigation relat-
ing to the defendant be consolidated in a single circuit; (2) the closeness of the connec-
tion of the designated state to the defendant’s crimes; and (3) the convenience and ac-
cessibility of the designated state for counsel, friends and family of both the defendant 
and the defendant’s victims, and the media.  Id. at 281–82.  Furthermore, in rejecting the 
Government’s request to order that defendant Sampson’s execution take place in Terre 
Haute, the court considered that “the execution of a human being by the state is perhaps 
the most solemn and significant act a government can perform” and, therefore, “should 
not be reduced to an invisible, bureaucratic function” in “the remote Midwest.”  Id. at 
280, 283. 
188 See U.S. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts 
of Appeals and United States District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/images/
CircuitMap.pdf. 
189 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 12, at 3. 
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six states authorizes the death penalty.  On the other hand, the two 
multi-district federal circuits in which capital punishment is least pre-
valent are the First and Second Circuits, both of which are located in 
the northeast.  The seven states that make up those two circuits—
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont—have collectively executed one person 
since 1976.190  Among the States in the First and Second Circuits, only 
Connecticut and New Hampshire authorize the death penalty.  How-
ever, as of last summer, there were almost as many federal capital cas-
es pending in the Eastern District of New York alone as there were in 
the eighteen federal districts of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits com-
bined.191 
This imbalance has not escaped notice in the non-death penalty 
jurisdictions that have been seemingly targeted by the Department of 
Justice.  New York is such a jurisdiction.  Since 1988, the federal pros-
ecutors have pursued nearly two dozen capital cases in New York but 
obtained only one death sentence.192  In one year alone, Attorney 
General Ashcroft ordered the U.S. Attorneys in Manhattan and 
Brooklyn to pursue the death penalty in ten cases in which the U.S. 
Attorneys had recommended against seeking death.193 
The forcefulness with which the Department of Justice has pur-
sued the death penalty in New York has recently led some federal 
judges to be uncharacteristically vocal about the Department’s ac-
tions.  Last year, Judge Jack Weinstein told a federal prosecutor that 
the prosecutor’s chances of convincing a jury to order a death sen-
tence were “virtually nil.”194  Judge Weinstein’s comments echoed 
those made roughly eleven months prior by Judge Frederic Block, 
who told federal prosecutors to “kindly advise Washington 
that . . . there is no chance in the world there would be a death pen-
 
190 Id.; see also Brigham, supra note 16, at 218 (“[New England] is decidedly less death-prone 
than the nation as a whole.”). 
191 FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES PENDING TRIAL, 
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Pending%20Trial.pdf (listing six cases 
pending in the Eastern District of New York and eight cases pending in Florida, Louisi-
ana, and Texas as of June 2, 2008). 
192 See Alan Feuer, An Aversion to the Death Penalty, But No Shortage of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2008, at B1 (nothing that “[i]n the 20 years since the federal death penalty statute was 
revived, no federal juries have been more reluctant to sentence federal defendants to 
death than those in New York”). 
193 Id. 
194 United States v. Taveras, No. 04-156 (JBW), 2008 WL 565495, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 
2008). 
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alty verdict” in the case then-pending before him.195  Shortly thereaf-
ter, a Brooklyn jury returned the first federal death sentence in New 
York in more than fifty years,196 but Judge Block cautioned that the 
Department’s lone success should not encourage federal prosecutors 
to bring more capital cases: 
In convicting Mr. Wilson and rejecting the death penalty in all of the 
other 16 death penalty cases, New Yorkers have sent a clear signal to the 
attorney general:  He should be more circumspect and realistic in au-
thorizing death penalty prosecutions, lest the judicial system be over-
whelmed, the community’s will ignored and taxpayer dollars improvi-
dently spent.197 
Expense was also a concern articulated by Judge Weinstein, who 
estimated that the capital case currently before him has already cost 
both parties more than $1.5 million and would probably cost twice 
that should the case proceed to trial.198  Judge Block also noted that 
the social cost of funneling money into capital prosecutions where 
success is unlikely is potentially great:  “[A] death penalty prosecution 
depletes the resources of the prosecutor’s office, making it more dif-
ficult to attend to the backlog of cases that don’t involve the death 
penalty.”199 
Three other Brooklyn judges have also criticized the federal gov-
ernment’s push for capital verdicts in New York.  Judge Nicholas Ga-
raufis has asked the Justice Department to reconsider its authoriza-
tions to seek the death penalty in at least two different cases.200  In 
another case, after a jury convicted a defendant of capital charges but 
before it began the penalty phase, Chief Judge Raymond Dearie 
asked prosecutors to reassess their request for the death penalty.201  
Finally, Judge John Gleeson has decried the Department’s attempt to 
“iron out” regional differences as “a bad idea,” prophesying that “it 
will be a long time before Georgia becomes just like Vermont, or New 
York City just like Houston.”202 
Uneasiness with the Department of Justice’s incursions into aboli-
tionist enclaves has not been limited to the bench.  In 2003, a defense 
 
195 William K. Rashbaum, Judge Urges U.S. to Drop Plan to Seek Death Penalty in Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2007, at B2. 
196 Michael Brick, Jury Agrees on Death Sentence for the Killer of Two Detectives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2007, at A1. 
197 Frederic Block, Op-Ed., A Slow Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at A27. 
198 Taveras, 2008 WL 565495, at *1. 
199 Block, supra note 197. 
200 Feuer, supra note 192. 
201 Joseph Goldstein, Judges Revolt over Death Penalty, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www2.nysun.com/article/72219. 
202 Gleeson, supra note 49, at 1728. 
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attorney successfully convinced a Brooklyn jury not to impose a death 
sentence on a gang leader convicted of multiple murders by empha-
sizing the role that Attorney General Ashcroft personally played in 
requiring prosecutors to seek the death penalty over the objections of 
the U.S. Attorney and the Review Committee.203  At the beginning of 
the penalty phase, defense attorney Richard Levitt told the jury that 
“John Ashcroft is asking you to kill Emile Dixon,”204 and in his closing, 
Levitt reminded the jury that Dixon’s “death penalty prosecution was 
ordered by John Ashcroft, that’s who it was ordered by.  He’s not your 
boss or conscious [sic]. . . . [Y]ou don’t have to listen to John Ash-
croft.”205 
Prosecutors too have had qualms about the Department’s death 
penalty initiative in non-death penalty states, but expressing such 
concerns to the Department has proven to be an occupational haz-
ard.  Of the nine U.S. Attorneys dismissed by the Bush administration 
in 2006,206 three of them quarreled with Main Justice over the admini-
stration of the federal death penalty.207  One of the fired prosecutors, 
Margaret Chiara, was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of 
Michigan—a federal district in the longest-standing non-death pen-
alty state.208  In 2003, Chiara flew to Washington in an unsuccessful at-
tempt to persuade Attorney General Ashcroft not to authorize the 
death penalty against two defendants, and she was publicly outspoken 
about her opposition to capital punishment.209  Defending Chiara’s 
dismissal, the Department of Justice said that she was fired because it 
had “no assurance that DOJ priorities/policies [were] being carried 
 
203 William Glaberson, Jury Rejects Death Penalty in 2 Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at B1 
(noting that, in Dixon’s case, Attorney General Ashcroft “overruled the federal prosecu-
tors to direct that they seek execution”). 
204 Transcript of Capital Hearing at 3420, United States v. Dixon, No. CR-01-389 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 19, 2003). 
205 Id. at 3970. 
206 See David Johnston & Eric Lipton, ‘Loyalty’ to Bush and Gonzales Was Factor in Prosecutors’ 
Firings, E-Mail Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A18.  For more information about the 
allegedly politicized firings of U.S. Attorneys, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L. RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf. 
207 Richard A. Serrano et al., At Justice, Life-and-Death Frictions:  Fired U.S. Attorneys in Califor-
nia, Michigan and Arizona Shared a Reluctance to Pursue Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2007, at 10. 
208 See Peter Slevin, Eyebrows are Raised in Mich. over Reasons for Prosecutor’s Firing, WASH. POST., 
Mar. 25, 2007, at A04 (“Some defense lawyers speculate that Chiara, who once trained to 
be a nun, fell out of favor with the Bush administration over her personal opposition to 
the death penalty.”). 
209 Serrano et al., supra note 207. 
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out” under her leadership210—an ambiguous statement that may well 
have referred to Main Justice’s sense that Chiara could not be trusted 
to assist with the Administration’s project of federalizing the death 
penalty.211 
Less ambiguous was the joint report of the Department of Justice’s 
Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility, 
which concluded that “the most significant factor in [U.S. Attorney 
for the District of Arizona Paul] Charlton’s removal was his actions in 
a death penalty case.”212  Though Arizona is a death penalty state, 
Charlton “persistently opposed the Department’s decision to seek the 
death penalty in a homicide case, and he irritated Department lead-
ers by seeking a meeting with the Attorney General” in an attempt to 
get Attorney General Gonzales to reverse his decision to authorize a 
capital prosecution.213  The report details Charlton’s contacts with 
numerous officials at Main Justice and the consequent email traffic 
among those officials by whom Charlton was described as “disrespect-
ful to the Attorney General.”  In that email traffic, a counselor in the 
Deputy Attorney General’s office wrote that she found “it very diffi-
cult to believe that [Charlton] was doing anything but trying to cir-
cumvent the AG’s [decision to authorize the death penalty].”214  With-
 
210 Id.  See also Johnston & Lipton, supra note 206 (noting that, in a document sent from the 
Department of Justice to White House Counsel Harriet Miers ranking federal prosecu-
tors, Chiara was listed as someone who “chafed against administration initiatives”).  Sev-
eral months later, during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearings on Michael Mu-
kasey’s nomination to become Attorney General, Congress probed the connection 
between the U.S. Attorney firings and the administration of the federal death penalty.  In 
response to a question from Senator Russell Feingold, an outspoken critic of the admini-
stration of the federal death penalty, Mukasey indicated his support for geographic uni-
formity, noting that “the system that was created in the Department is supposed to treat 
[defendants] the same way” without regard to whether a particular jurisdiction is “more 
accustomed to or inured to or favorable to the death penalty.”  Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 173–74 (2007). 
211 See Liliana Segura, Attorney General, Capital Punishment, NATION, Mar. 29, 2007, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070409/segura (“Both Paul Charlton of Arizona and 
Margaret Chiara of Michigan have been criticized for failing to seek death sentences with 
significant gusto.  Both US Attorneys were pressured to participate in an aggressive cam-
paign begun by former Attorney General John Ashcroft and continued by Gonzales to ex-
tend the federal death penalty—particularly into jurisdictions without death-penalty stat-
utes of their own.”). 
212 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 335. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 230–31.  These comments and accusations were the result of Charlton’s decision to 
ask the district court to extend the time to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty 
even after Attorney General Gonzales signed the notice and delivered it to Charlton.  Ac-
cording to the report, this situation prompted a change in the wording of the Attorney 
General’s missives to U.S. Attorneys in death penalty cases, which now states, “You are au-
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in a month of Charlton’s failed attempt to meet with Gonzales, Gon-
zales’s Chief of Staff Kyle Sampson added Charlton’s name to a list 
entitled “USAs We Now Should Consider Pushing Out,” and Charlton 
was ordered to resign fewer than three months thereafter.215  The 
Charlton episode is significant because it further demonstrates how 
the Department of Justice under Attorney General Gonzales zealously 
pursued federal capital prosecutions.216 
Perhaps the most significant response to the Department’s impo-
sition of the federal death penalty in a non-death penalty jurisdiction 
has been seen in Puerto Rico.  Testifying before Congress in 2007, 
Roberto Sánchez Ramos, the Puerto Rican Secretary of Justice, stated 
that “the Puerto Rican people strongly disagree with the use of death 
as a form of punishment.”217  That disagreement, he said, is grounded 
in “the religious convictions of the majority of Puerto Ricans, their 
strict adherence to the guarantee of the equal protection of the law, 
the grounding of [Puerto Rico’s] legal system on the principles of a 
continental European model which has moved away from the death 
penalty, [and] a very particular understanding of the powers that may 
be safely, wisely, legitimately and justly ascribed to the State.”218  Puer-
to Rico’s deep-seated opposition to capital punishment is reflected in 
its Constitution, which declares bluntly that “[t]he death penalty shall 
not exist.”219  Nonetheless, Puerto Rico has been a virtual repository 
for the Department of Justice’s capital prosecution efforts and once 
had the greatest number of pending death penalty cases in the entire 
federal system.220  However, Puerto Ricans did not believe that statistic 
to be worth bragging about, noting instead that: 
 
thorized and directed to seek the death penalty.”  Id. at 233 n.150 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
215 Id. at 220. 
216 Further evidence of the Department’s attitude towards the federal death penalty can be 
found in a March 15, 2004 email from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bradley 
Schlozman to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wan Kim discussing the hiring of attor-
neys for the Civil Rights Division in which Schlozman wrote that “any candidate must pro-
fess his/her willingness to zealously prosecute both death penalty and [partial-birth abor-
tion] cases.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L. 
RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER 
IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 24 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf. 
217 Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 303 (testimony of Roberto J. Sán-
chez Ramos, Sec’y of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on behalf of Aníbal Acevedo 
Vilá, Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). 
218 Id. 
219 P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7. 
220 See Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 313–14; see also United States v. 
Acosta Martinez (Acosta Martinez I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 311 & n.1 (D.P.R. 2000) (“The 
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The pursuit of the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico stands against the 
highest social, cultural, political, moral and religious values of the mem-
bers of our community, and violates the balance of power and comity 
that the people of Puerto Rico envision as transcendental to their rela-
tionship with the United States.221 
In 2000, a federal district court judge held that FDPA did not ap-
ply in Puerto Rico because the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act 
mandated that federal laws that were “locally inapplicable” would not 
affect the commonwealth.222  The judge cited the Commonwealth 
Constitution and declared the imposition of capital punishment for 
“crimes committed wholly within the boundaries of the Common-
wealth” to be “unconscionable and against the most basic notion of 
justice.”223  Accordingly, the judge struck the death penalty certifica-
tion in the case and ordered the Department of Justice to proceed 
with the prosecution “as an ordinary felony case.”224 
However, less than a year later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court.225  The court concluded that “[t]he death 
penalty is intended to apply to Puerto Rico [sic] federal defendants 
just as it applies to such defendants in the various states,” and that, 
reflecting the supremacy of federal law, Acts of Congress “trump” 
provisions in state and commonwealth constitutions.226  Furthermore, 
the court said that, notwithstanding “Puerto Rico’s interest and its 
moral and cultural sentiment against the death penalty,” Congress 
“retains federal power over federal crimes.”227 
 
Puerto Rico U.S. Attorney’s Office has submitted the largest number of potential death 
penalty cases (59) of any of the 94 federal districts since the Capital Case Review protocol 
was issued in 1995.”). 
221 Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 314. 
222 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1994) (“The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplica-
ble . . . shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 321–27.  For 
more information on the locally inapplicable standard, see Elizabeth Vincens, Application 
of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico:  A New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 350 (2005). 
223 Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 327. 
224 Id. 
225 See United States v. Acosta-Martinez (Acosta Martinez II), 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001). 
226 Id. at 20. 
227 Id. at 19–20.  Federal courts in non-death penalty states have reached the same conclu-
sion.  See, e.g., United States v. O’Reilly, No. 05-80025, 2007 WL 2421378, at *4 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 23, 2007) (“While Michigan is free to prohibit the death penalty for state-
charged crimes, this federal Court cannot prohibit imposition of the death penalty when 
authorized by federal law for federally-charged crimes . . . .”); United States v. Tuck 
Chong, 123 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (D. Haw. 1999) (“The federal government has jurisdic-
tion to prosecute Defendant, charged with a crime against the United States, in federal 
court.  Moreover, the federal government has jurisdiction to determine the appropriate 
sentence under federal law.”). 
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After the First Circuit’s ruling, Attorney General Ashcroft pro-
ceeded with the capital cases against Acosta Martinez and his co-
defendant.  On July 31, 2003, both men were acquitted of capital 
murder and cleared of all charges.228  Commentators believed that the 
acquittals were designed to show Washington that the Federal Gov-
ernment would not succeed in exporting the death penalty to Puerto 
Rico.229  Responding to the verdict, Secretary Sánchez Ramos cau-
tioned, “when the federal government seeks death in jurisdictions 
such as Puerto Rico, it disregards the possibility of jury nullification at 
its own risk . . . and at the risk of future potential victims of crime.”230 
Federalization of the death penalty has also engendered hostility 
in other non-death penalty jurisdictions.  In 2003, after federal prose-
cutors secured a death sentence against Gary Lee Sampson in Massa-
chusetts, the chairman of Massachusetts Citizens Against the Death 
Penalty credited the trial with increasing his organization’s member-
ship.231  In 2005, after a federal jury in Burlington, Vermont convicted 
Donald Fell of a fatal carjacking, the local mayor called the federal 
death penalty “an affront to state’s [sic] rights[,] . . . not consistent 
with the values of a majority of Vermonters.”232  The mayor also sin-
gled out the former Attorney General for blame:  “Many of us resent 
 
228 Abby Goodnough, Acquittal in Puerto Rico Averts Fight over Government’s Right to Seek Death 
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A14. 
229 Leonard Post, Puerto Rican Prosecutors Weigh Retrial; Acquittals Ended a Fight over the Death 
Penalty, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at 4. 
230 Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 311.  This phenomenon mirrors 
that seen in the United States before juries were permitted to return non-death verdicts 
in capital cases.  See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.  Using an acquittal in a 
capital case as a means of sending a message to the prosecutors is nothing new; as the Su-
preme Court observed in 1976, “[a]merican jurors have, with some regularity, disre-
garded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the au-
tomatic consequence of a guilty verdict” since the late 1700s.  Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976). 
231 Dade, supra note 34 (“What we’ve seen is that this case has really drawn people toward the 
abolition movement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
232 Lynne Tuohy, Federal Case Riles Many in Vermont; Death Penalty Quest ‘Wildly Unpopular’, 
HARTFORD COURANT, July 4, 2005, at A1.  But see Katie Zezima, In Rare Case, Vermont Jury 
Backs Death for a Killer, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2005, at A10 (quoting late Vermont Law 
School professor Michael Mello as explaining that “[t]he people of Vermont are much 
more ambivalent about the death penalty than our elites, our chattering classes”).  How-
ever, questioning “the appropriateness of a federal court or jury even considering local 
values,” Judge Reena Raggi, writing on behalf of six judges on the Second Circuit, re-
cently rejected the proposition that the Constitution requires “a special solicitude for lo-
cal values.”  See United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2009) (Raggi, J., concur-
ring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that deference to “local values” 
would “appropriately be rejected out of hand if the local ‘value’ . . . were opposition to 
the sorts of civil rights, environmental, or gun trafficking requirements that are enforced 
through federal criminal law in ways not always mirrored in state legislation”). 
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the imposition of a death penalty as an option in this state by John 
Ashcroft and his friends from Washington.”233  And two years ago, 
when Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr. was sentenced to death by a federal jury 
in North Dakota, even the prosecuting U.S. Attorney observed that 
the death penalty is “just not part of the culture up here really at 
all.”234 
VI.  WHAT’S NEXT:  A NEW EXECUTIVE, BUT THE SAME EXECUTIONS? 
Though the Department of Justice has yet to release fresh data 
that would permit us to analyze the decisions made by Attorney Gen-
eral Mukasey with regard to federal capital prosecutions in non-death 
penalty states,235 we doubt that there was any significant departure 
from the precedent set by Mukasey’s predecessors.236  However, it is 
conceivable that a shift—perhaps even a major shift—will result from 
President Barack Obama’s appointment of Eric Holder, a prominent 
opponent of capital punishment, as Attorney General.  Insofar as 
Holder, who was Deputy Attorney General under Janet Reno,237 has 
experience with the 1995 procedures to which various political and 
legal organizations are advocating a return,238 a repeal of the 2001 
and 2005 protocols is entirely possible. 
 
233 Tuohy, supra note 232; see also Fell, 571 F.3d at 286 (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (describing Attorney General Ashcroft’s rejection of a plea agree-
ment whereby Fell would have pled guilty in exchange for a sentence of life imprison-
ment and arguing that “the draft plea agreement reflected the judgments of Vermont-
based law enforcement enforcers on what was appropriate locally, and its overruling by 
Main Justice reflected a centralist, and in this case decidedly anti-federalist, decision”). 
234 Libby Sander, Judge Imposes Death in Killing of North Dakota Student, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2007, at A15. 
235 During his confirmation hearing, Attorney General-nominee Eric Holder discussed his 
involvement in preparing the Justice Department’s 2000 survey of the federal death pen-
alty, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at which time Holder told Senator Russ Fein-
gold that “[i]t might be . . . an appropriate time to do another study and then share the 
results, as we did, in that first—in that first study.”  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of Eric H. Holder to be Attorney General of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 67 (2009).   
236 See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis—Reminders to Encourage a 
Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 87 n.104 (2008) (noting that neither “for-
mer Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales nor his successor Michael B. Mukasey” re-
scinded policies promulgated by Attorney General John Ashcroft designed to reduce sen-
tencing disparities). 
237 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/meet-
ag.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
238 See, e.g., 2009 CRIM. JUST. TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 164–65 (2008), 
http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice. 
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A number of interest groups have seized upon Attorney General 
Holder’s appointment as an opportunity to push for change.  Among 
the organizations pushing for the repudiation of the Bush admini-
stration’s death penalty procedures is the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund (“LDF”), which, as part of the 2009 Criminal Jus-
tice Transition Coalition, has proposed a dozen ways to reform the 
federal death penalty.239  The LDF’s recommendations observe that 
the uptick in federal capital prosecutions over the past eight years was 
the result of “the U.S. Attorney General’s affirmative agenda to seek 
capital sentences, often in direct contravention of local U.S. Attor-
neys’ own recommendations not to seek the death penalty.”240  The 
“overcentralization of the federal death penalty’s decision-making 
process” is described as “cumbersome, slow, and extremely costly” 
and is blamed for “more frequent federal capital prosecutions in ju-
risdictions that have abolished the death penalty under state law.”241  
Accordingly, the LDF has recommended that the Department of Jus-
tice strip out from the death penalty protocols those provisions that 
permit Main Justice to review death-eligible cases even where the U.S. 
Attorney has not requested permission to seek the death penalty.242 
Similarly, a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York (“City Bar”) recommended that the Attorney General re-
view only those death-eligible cases in which U.S. Attorneys request 
authorization to seek the death penalty.243  In cases where such a re-
quest is made, review by Main Justice should be automatic and focus 
on the facts of the individual case rather than on macro concerns 
(such as geographic uniformity).244  According to the City Bar, capital 
prosecutions should be authorized only where “a very substantial fed-
eral interest in pursuing the death penalty” exists, and prosecutors 
 
239 During the 1960s, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund waged a successful 
campaign to halt executions while the constitutionality of the death penalty was being 
challenged in the federal courts.  See BANNER, supra note 29, at 252; THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN AMERICA:  CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 45, at 184–85. 
240 2009 CRIM. JUST. TRANSITION COAL., supra note 238, at 164. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 165; see 2001 DOJ PROTOCOL, supra note 168, § 9-10.040. 
243 ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATEMENT TO 
THE JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS TRANSITION TEAM REGARDING FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES 1 
(2008), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Capital_Punishment_Transition_Memo.pdf.  
Though the Statement is very interesting, it contains several significant errors.  For ex-
ample, the Statement credits “the first Bush Administration” with the 1995 Protocols even 
though, as discussed above, the Protocols were instituted by President Clinton’s Attorney 
General, Janet Reno, and it recommends that “the Obama Administration adopt those 
protocols that were in effect prior to 1995” even though there were no federal death pen-
alty protocols until 1995.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
244 ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 243, at 1–2. 
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should be permitted to engage in non-capital plea bargains without 
approval from the Attorney General.245 
Unlike the LDF, the City Bar “urge[d] the Obama Administration 
not to seek the death penalty in states which do not have death pen-
alty laws,” except in cases involving “substantial federal issues,” such 
as treason, terrorism, or the murder of a federal agent.246  The City 
Bar denounced the Bush administration’s attempt to achieve national 
uniformity as “futile,” and declared that “[m]aking one region or 
state just like every other region or state in criminal matters is not 
necessarily desirable, especially where the death penalty is con-
cerned.”247 
Attorney General Holder has made several statements that suggest 
he may not agree with the City Bar’s position on the undesirability of 
uniformity.  Most recently, during his confirmation hearing, Holder 
said that the Department of Justice’s 2000 report on the death pen-
alty “raised some very disturbing questions about not only the racial 
identity of people who were in the death system—in the federal death 
system, but also the geographic distribution of those people.”248  And 
even before the 2000 report was published, Holder expressed support 
for greater uniformity in the application of the death penalty: 
Federal cases have to be judged on a nationwide standard.  We have one 
system, and it is appropriate for people in the federal system all to be 
treated in the same way.  And that’s one of the things that we try to 
search for, especially when it comes to the death penalty.  We look—we 
strive for uniformity in the application of federal law and in the treat-
ment of people who are federal defendants.249 
Additionally, though Holder’s opposition to capital punishment is 
well known, he has indicated that he would not allow his personal be-
liefs to interfere with his duty as the Justice Department’s highest of-
ficial to administer the federal death penalty.  For example, during 
his first confirmation hearing in 1997, after Holder acknowledged 
that he is “not a proponent of the death penalty,” he immediately as-
sured the Senate Judiciary Committee that “even with those statutes 
 
245 Id. at 2. 
246 Id. at 2.  The LDF alluded to the federalization of the death penalty in non-death penalty 
states by noting that “overcentralization . . . has resulted in more frequent federal capital 
prosecutions” during the past eight years, but, it did not target that concern specifically in 
its recommendations.  See 2009 CRIM. JUST. TRANSITION COAL., supra note 238, at 164. 
247 ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 243, at 2. 
248 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Eric H. Holder to be Attorney General of the United 
States, supra note 235, at 67. 
249 Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States, Justice Department Weekly News 
Conference (Feb. 10, 2000) (transcript available through CQ Transcriptions). 
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that have death penalty provisions, they will be fully enforced.”250  The 
fact that President Obama has endorsed capital punishment for cer-
tain heinous crimes, while at the same time leveling a number of crit-
icisms at the manner in which the death penalty is implemented, 
leaves us uncertain as to whether reform of the federal death penalty 
will be a priority for the new administration.251 
Prosecutors, of course, have enormous discretion, and as dis-
cussed above the DOJ’s Guidelines with respect to seeking the death 
penalty are intended to channel that discretion to a more uniform 
application.  While the possibility of a return to the 1995 procedures 
may be welcomed by opponents of the death penalty and advocates 
for more local control of such decision making, it does highlight just 
one example of the way in which politics—and in particular which 
party occupies the White House and the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral—seems to be inextricably linked to the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Considered alongside other flip-flops over the past several 
Administrations on how much discretion federal prosecutors should 
have in determining which charges to bring, what kinds of plea deals 
to offer, and how constrained such decision making should be by the 
Sentencing Guidelines,252 the prospect of changes and reversals in 
federal death penalty protocols raises the question of whether such 
policies ought to be determined through some less political and/or 
more bipartisan mechanism that might avoid as many significant 
changes from administration to administration and thus reduce the 
appearance (if not the reality) of a politicized Department of Jus-
tice.253 
 
250 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Eric H. Holder to be Deputy Attorney General of the 
United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 61 (1997). 
251 See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 58 (2006) (“I believe there are some crimes—
mass murder, the rape and murder of a child—so heinous, so beyond the pale, that the 
community is justified in expressing the full measure of its outrage by meting out the ul-
timate punishment.”); see also id. (describing capital cases in Illinois as “rife with error, 
questionable police tactics, racial bias, and shoddy lawyering”); Christi Parsons, Ryan Ve-
toes Expanded Death Penalty, Governor Rejects Bill to Include Gang Slayings, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 
2001, at 13 (quoting then-State Senator Obama as noting “a strong overlap between gang 
affiliation and young men of color,” and opposing legislation that would have made gang-
related murder a capital offense because “it’s problematic for [young men of color] to be 
singled out as more likely to receive the death penalty for carrying out certain acts than 
are others who do the same thing”). 
252 See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 56. 
253 As former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White testified before Congress, one of the reasons that 
the politicized firings of U.S. Attorneys were so troubling was because they “under-
mine[d] the importance of the office of the United States Attorney, the independence of 
the United States Attorneys, and the public’s sense of evenhanded and impartial justice.”  
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Since Congress resurrected the federal death penalty in 1988, the 
Department of Justice has pursued capital cases in non-death penalty 
states with increasing frequency, but the Department’s endeavor un-
der former Attorneys General Ashcroft, Gonzales, and Mukasey to 
expand the death penalty has proven relatively ineffective.  Though 
the Department has authorized capital prosecutions for nearly forty 
defendants in non-death penalty states, only nine death sentences 
have been imposed.  Courts have upheld the Department’s actions as 
being constitutionally permissible given the supremacy of federal law, 
but the federal death penalty has been unwelcome and met with hos-
tility in jurisdictions that have affirmatively abolished or otherwise re-
frained from enacting local capital sentencing laws.  Citing concerns 
of judicial economy and allocation of prosecutorial resources, federal 
judges and even some federal prosecutors have argued that the At-
torney General should defer to the U.S. Attorney’s assessment of 
whether to pursue the death penalty in a particular case.  Whether 
Attorney General Holder will heed the recommendations of several 
reformist organizations and herald a return to the death penalty pro-
tocols that were in place when he was Attorney General Reno’s dep-
uty—protocols that vested substantially more discretion at the local 
U.S. Attorney’s Office level—remains to be seen. 
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